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1. South Africa and the llPortuguese World1' 
Mozambique is a territory with very little autonomy in any 
sphere. By Portuguese law it is an "overseas province" of a "pluri- 
continental pluri-ethnic nation1', whose capital is Lisbon, and it is 
in Lisbon that any kind of official link between South Africa and 
Mozambique, down to the most paltry matters, must be examined and 
approved. Thus South African involvement with its neighbour is 
necessarily an involvement within the wider context of the "Portuguese 
World1', which we must consider briefly in this opening section. 
With regard to Metropolitan Portugal and the scattered d&bris 
of Ehpire in West Africa and Asia, this does not amount to very much. 
Portugal's support at the U.N. does something to lessen South Africa's 
isolation in the world, and Portuguese possessions in West Africa 
provide stepping stones to Europe for South Africa's planes and ships. 
South African capital invests a little in Portugal (l), and there is 
some trade with Portugal and with S ~ O  Thome and Macau (2) . But, 
fundamentally, it is with Angola and Mozambique that South African- 
Portuguese relations are concerned - and with the wider problems of 
newly independent Africa. If Portugal is hindered by appearances of 
an alliance with a "racist" state, and South Africa finds the last 
remaining colonialist power something of an embarrassment in her 
overtures to Black Africa, the realities of power polifics nevertheless 
weld Portugal and South Africa, together with Rhodesia, into a solid 
block in Southern Africa vis-a-vis African nationalism. 
It is therefore worth looking very briefly at South African 
involvement in Angola, before turning to our main theme. From the 
economic point of view, South African influence is weak, but growing 
fast. Trade with South Africa has nearly doubled over the last decade 
as a percentage of the total value of Angola's foreign commerce ( 3 ) ,  
whilst remaining, in 1968, at about a quarter of the value of 
Mozambique 8 S trade with South Africa (4) . Angola is particularly 
interested in South Africa as the fastest growing market for her 
coffee (5), which made up around 800% of her exports to South Africa, in 
value, in 1967 (6). South Africa values Angola as a market for her 
industrial goods and food products, and as one of the few areas with 
which she has a very favourable balance of trade. (7) 
South African investment is still weak and concentrated in 
the mining field, particularly a long-standing involvement in DIAP/IANG, 
Angola's huge diamond monopoly, and a more recent involvement in 
Angolan oil production. (8) South African tourists are beginning to 
come to Angola, and there has been labour migration to the Rand since 
the late 19th century (c.17,000 in 1967). (9) But South Africals most 
important links with Angola stem from her attempts to develop South 
West African Ovamboland as z'!l3antustad',,which has led her to co-operate 
with Portugal in the vast scheme to develop the Cunene basin, the first 
stage of which will cost about £35 million, split equally between South 
Africa and Portugal. (10) Labour migration from Angola to South West 
Africa, currently only about 10,000 a year (11) , is also to be 
intensified. 
From the military point of view, it is also South African 
concern with the northern marches of South West Africa that has led to 
co-operation with Portugal. Faced with SWAPO attempts at infiltration 
from Zambia via the Caprivi Zipfel, aided by Jonas Savimbils UNITA, the 
South African army would seem to have mounted a considerable campaign 
in the area and have given help to the Portuguese forces, particularly 
logistic help in the form of helicopters, in an attempt to stamp out 
guerilla activity. (12) 
Thus South African relations with Portugal over Mozambiqile 
are also conditioned by her growing involvement in Angola, particularly 
southern Angola; and the general situation in the whole of Southern 
Africa must be borne in mind as we look more closely at the problem of 
Mozambique. 
2 .  South Africa and Mozambique - the historical background 
Without the gold mines there would have been no South Africa; 
without Mozambique labour there would have been no gold mines. In a 
somewhat exaggerated form, this sentence expresses the essence of the 
historical links between South Africa and Mozambique from the end of the 
nineteenth century. Intimately linked with the labour question, but 
nearly alwws of secondary importance, has been the problem of 
communications to the Rand from the port of Louren~o Marques. LaSjour 
migration from southern Mozambique to Nata1,and later to the Transvaal, 
is said to have begun in 1873 in Tonga traditions (13), but would seem 
in fact to have begun earlier, perhaps in the 1860s. (14) The agreement 
for the construction of a railway from Louren~o Masques to the Rand was 
signed in 1884,but the railway did not begin to operate till 1894 and 
immediately came into competition with the routes to the Cape. (15) 
The crisis in South African-Mozambique relations in the 1920s illustrates 
the way in which these two problems interacted. 
In 1922 the Union Government repudiated the 1909 Convention, 
largely to protect its ports against the competition from Louren~o 
Marques. After years of complex negotiations,the Portuguese Government 
issued a decree in 1927 restricting the recruitment of labour, which 
resulted in the next year in the signing of a new Convention (16) which, 
although periodically modified since, has remained as the basis of 
economic relations between the Union and Mozambique. In return for the 
gua.rantee of just under 50% of the Rand's exports passing through 
Lourengo Marques, the W.N.L.A. was allowed to recruit workers from below 
the 22nd parallel. (17) In 1940 the maximum number was fixed at 100,000 
and the minimum number at 65,000 (18), the period of recruitment being 
for a maximum of 18 months with a 6-month compulsory rest period. This 
Convention underlines the essentially passive role of the Mozambique 
economy vis-&-vis its more powerful neighbour, demonstrated during the 
world slump of the 1930s when crisis on the Rand sent thousands of 
unemployed Tongas back into Mozambique and seriously diminished the 
traffic of Lourengo Marques. (19) 
The mjor factor underlying the relations between South Africa 
and Mozambique, then, has been the steady and massive labour migrations 
of the Tonga and Chopi to the mines of the Witwatersrand. For the 
Chamber of Mines these "East Coast Boys" were not only the major source 
of labour (c .80,000, or three-quarters of the mining labour force,before 
the Boer war) (20) but also the best quality work force. They stayed 
longer than any other group, the supply of labour not being affected by 
the agricultural cycle (21), they came from a near-by and relatively 
densely populated area, and they were the best underground labour. (22) 
The comment of the Chamber of Mines in 1897 that Mozambique was "the 
chief and most satisfactory source of supply" of labour (23) was often 
to be repeated. 
The causes of this labour migration have been hotly debated.(24) 
From the heat of the discussion it appears clear that the underlying 
cause has been the relative agricultural poverty of an area with low 
fertility sandy soils, aggravated by the disruptions caused by the Ngoni 
invasions and facilitated by particular social customs as to the division 
of labour and the family structure. But with the defeat of Gungmrhana 
in 1895 Ngoni raiding ceased, and the prevailing "pressure factor" became 
the Portuguese administration. To understand the nature of this 
pressure it is important to seize the exact nature of Portuguese 
colonialism, from the 1890s through to the 1960s. 
Portugal, a poor, underdeveloped country, inherited a residual 
colonial empire in Africa. Faced with the "Scramble", the Portuguese 
bourgeoisie reacted violently. ltJ!Jational Pridett was incarnate in the 
colonies, the only vestiges of Portugal's past greatness, and these had 
to be maintained at all costs. But as no capital was available in 
Portugal, itself a semi-colony of Ehgland, and as foreign capital was 
considered the back door into the colonies for other powers (not 
unreasonably, considering Genaan;yl S machinations) , the only way to 
develop the colonies and forestall the other powers was by the intensive 
use of labour. As this could not be induced, it had to be forced. (25) 
But in southern Mozambique the forced labour provisions of 
the famous 1899 labour code could only be self-defeating, for, however 
bad wages and work conditions were in the Witwatersrand mines, they 
were still better than forced labour in the Louren~o Marques docks or 
on European plantations. As the Portuguese labour recruiters scoured 
the countryside, all those who could not "prove empl~yment~~ swamped the 
recruiting centres of the W.N.L.A. (26) In addition, clandestine labour 
migrants poured into the Transvaal, so thak there were usually about 
the same number of clandestine as of legal workers. (27) And so the 
Portuguese authorities in Mozambique resigned themselves to a passive 
but fairly rewarding economic existence, catering to the various needs 
of the Witwatersrand which Mozambique1s geographical position enabled 
her to fulfil. 
3. South Africa andMozambique - the 1960s 
This state of affairs was rudely shattered by the 1961 revolt 
in Angola. Two things suddenly became clear to the Portuguese 
administration: that forced labour in the 1960s was an open provocation 
to revolt, and that the underdeveloped state of the "overseas provincesf~ 
made them militarily difficult to hold and provided only the most 
tenuous elements of a "collaborating class1f. This led to a series of 
major refoms, the most important of which were the new labour code of 
1962 (28) and the new law governing foreign investments in 1965 (29). 
In addition, the State inaugurated an important series of investments 
in the infrastructure and the presence of a large army stimulated the 
economy. 
Although the liberation struggle of FRELIMO did not get under 
way till 1964, the effects of the Angolan uprising were felt from 1961 
in Mozambique, and this may account for the fact that no outbreak of 
similar violence occurred. The guerillas have hardly ever crossed the 
Zambezi, and for the most part their action has been confined to a 
very small area in the far north, a.nd yet it is the threat of guerilla 
war that has suddenly woken the Portuguese administration from a long 
period of inactivity and inaugurated a modest boom in Mozambiquets 
~elations economy. (30) This has to a certain extent modified the -: 
between South Africa and Mozambique, which gives the decade 1960-70 a 
certain unity and distinctiveness. We shall look mainly at the 
development of economic links between the two, briefly at military 
co-operation, and end with an analysis of the relations that exist 
between the Mozambique settlers and the South African whites. 
4. Labour, Transport, and Tourism 
In 1960 the&?~rs~Committee estimated the total number of 
Mozambique workers in South Africa at 220,000 (legal and clandestine) 
and stated that they formed 22.4% of the work force in the gold mines 
and 45.3% of the work force in the coal mines. (31) Table A gives the 
numbers officially registered by the Portuguese Curadoria in the 
Transvaal, which includes a large number of clandestine migrants whom 
the Portuguese try to get to register so as not to lose all control 
over them and to get them to pay some tax. It is worth noting that in 
Table A 
MOZAMBIQUE LABOUR IN TRANSVAAL 
Dec. 1964 Dec. 1965 Dec. 1966 Dec. 1967 Dec. 1968 
Total : 161,708 162,691 146,526 148,697 142 7 934 
Gold mines: 88 9 644 94,633 91,264 90,555 
Coal mines: 14,483 14,671 14,618 15,505 
Source: Anuario Estatistico, Provincia de Mo~ambique, 1965-8 
n.b. : These figures include legal migrants plus those whom 
the "Curadoria" has discovered. They do not include 
other clandestine migrants, either in the Transvaal 
or in other Provinces. 
1954 there were 173,433 workers registered (month?) (32), which, with 
the figures given in Table A, suggests that there has been a gradual 
but steady drop in the total number employed in South Africa, owing 
possibly to the new labour code of 1962. (33) But Table B would seem 
to suggest that the amount of foreign currency derived from this 
activity is increasing rapidly, the reason for which is not entirely 
clear although rising salaries and an increase of migration to Rhodesia 
may provide part of the answer. 
Table B 
MOZAMBIQUE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS - SELECTED I T W  (in 
1,000 escudos) 
Salaries : + 125,088 + 197,968 + 255,186 + 333,383 
Transport : +1,113,639 +1,627,089 +1,689,812 +1,977,631 
Tourism : + 13,608 + 75,037 + 79,451 + 98,583 
Source: as above 
But,if we look at Table B again, what is particularly 
striking is the importance to Mozambique's economy of her role as a 
transporter of goods from the coast to the inland countries. In 1968 
the currency derived from this activity more than covered her total 
trade deficit. Part of this traffic, of course, comes from Malawi and 
Rhodesia and even further inland, but the main port remains by far 
Lourengo Marques, althou& with the completion of the line into 
Swaziland, and the new line to Rhodesia (coupled with the effects of the 
Beira blockade), all of Louren~o Marques! traffic no longer comes from 
the Rand. However, perhaps half of this lucrative source of foreign 
currency still comes from South Africa, and it is worth stressing again 
that this is to a large extent an artificial situation, a concession 
gained in exchange for labour recruiting privileges. In 1968 the 
Republic paid a substantial sum to the Portuguese Government in 
compensation for the fact that the prescribed quota had not been 
observed (4,382,000  and) . (34) 
The development of another form of transport, roads, is 
closely linked to a third source of invisible earnings, tourism. From 
Table B one can see that this is still a modest but growing source of 
income. Many of these tourists are white Rhodesians, but,with the 
completion of the tarmac road from Louren~o Marques to the Gorongosa 
National Park along the hundreds of miles of Mozambique beaches, it is 
hoped that the South African element, already important in the south, 
will venture farther north. From about 60,000 at the beginning of the 
decade (35), the nwnber of tourists had grown to around 250,000 in 
1969 (36), and with the setting up of the touristic circuit South 
~frica/Mozambi~ue/hda~ascar the numbers are expected to grow still 
more* (37) 
Mozambique's economy is then still a passive economy, 
financing its large trade deficit by exploiting its natural geographical 
advantages and its reservoir of unemployed labour to cater to the needs 
of its more prosperous and dynamic white neighbours in Rhodesia and 
South Africa. But over the last ten years it has begun to show signs of 
evolving a little from this purely passive role, and has begun to build 
up its own production and trade. The role of South Africa as a market 
for Mozambique's products and as a source of new investments will thus 
be examined next. 
5. Trade and South African Investment 
Mozambiquels trade with South Africa from 1963-8 is set out 
in Table C, with a break-down by principal items of trade for 1967 in 
Table D. The first thing to note is that in 1968 Mozambique accounted 
Tabla C 
MOZAMBIQUE: TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA (in 1,000 escudos) 
Imports Exports 
Sources: as above, 1965-8; 1963: Profiles et Perspectives 
Economiques 1966. 
for only a little over l@!% of South Africa's total trade with Africa, or 1% 
of Soutli Africa's total world trade. (38) From the Mozambique viewpoint, 
however, trade with South Africa is an important part of her total trade, 
South Africa having supplemented the U.K. as her second partner, after 
Portugal and the escudo zone. (39) 
The second point worth making is to emphasize the enormous 
deficit in Mozambique's trade with South Africa, which would be even 
more remarkable if it were not for her petrolem exports from the 
refinery at Louren~o Marques (see end of Table D). This is, of course, 
more than made up by the invisible earnings that Mozambique receives 
from South Africa, as we saw in the last section. 
Table D 
TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA - PRINCIPAL ITENS, 1967 (in 1,000 escudos) 
Imports: Fresh Fish 
Dairy Products 
Fruit & Vegetables 
Vegetable Oils 
Petroleum Products 
~edicines/~nsecticides/Perfwne 
Semi-worked Metals 
Vehicles (cars, Tractors, ~orries) 
Spare parts 
borts: Fruit  anan an as & Cashew ~uts) 19,043 
Sisal 20,852 
Wood (~ogs & Sawn wood) 95,928 
Vegetable Oils 17,178 
Petroleum Products 205,204 
Source: Anuario Estatistico, Vol. 2, 1967 
Thirdly, one can see very clearly from Table D that, with the 
exception of Mozambique's refined oil exports, the relationship is very 
much one of developed to underdeveloped country, South Africa exporting 
mainly manufactured or semi-manufactured goods, and importing untreated 
or scarcely treated primary goods. 
If it is possible to obtain figures concerning the nature and 
extent of Mozambique-South African trade, from Portuguese sources at aay 
rate, the same cannot be said for investment figures. Here one is 
forced to be much more fragmentary and imprecise, the task being made 
appreciably more difficult by the considerable interlocking of British 
and South African companies. (40) The U.N. "Committee of 24", which 
has made noteworthy efforts to unravel this complex tangle, suggests 
that by the end of the decade South Africa had become the principal 
power investing in Mozambique. (41) Be that as it may, it is certain 
that South African investments are of great and growing importance in 
Mozambique and that they have been quick to seize the opportunities 
provided by the new investment laws of 1965. 
A second general point to be noted is the predominance of 
Anglo-American, which has a finger in practically every important pie 
in Mozambique. Explosives (42), fisheries (43), cashew nuts (44), and 
even petroleum prospection (45) ,are all activities in which Anglo- 
American has invested recently in Mozambique. South African capital is 
also involved in hotels (46), fertilizer plants (47), sugar refining (48), 
and, of course, mining and prospection (49). 
From the point of view of Mozambiquets agricultural production, 
it is probably South African involvement in cashew nuts, of which 
Mozambique is the world's largest producer, which is most important, 
for Anglo-American dominates the "Industria de Caju Mocitas", which 
decorticates the nuts and has recently asked for a concession to 
establish plantations in the North. (50) Cashew nuts formed nearly 
20% of Mozambiquets exports in 1966, the largest single item. (51) 
As to the mining concessions, these are still largely at the 
stage of prospection, the most important concession being that granted 
to the "Johannesburg Consolidated Investments Compaqy Ltd." in 1969 of 
26,000 square kilometers in the Zambezi valley around Cabora-Bassa, 
on very easy terms. (52) In the petroleum field, a Franco-Germano- 
South African consortium, in which Anglo-American has a 50% part, has 
been awarded three concession blocks along the coast. (53) 
Lastly, one must remember South African state participation 
in certain infrastructure works, such as the extension of the Nacala 
railway line into Malawi (54) and co-operation over the harnessing of 
the River Maputo (or ~ongola) in the extreme south. (55) But the one 
scheme which towers over all the rest, in which private and state 
capital are both involved, is the Cabora-Bassa dam, to which we shall 
dedicate the last section dealing with the economic links between South 
Africa and Mozambique. 
6. Cabora-Bassa 
The dam at Cabora-Bassa is a part of a much wider scheme, the 
"General Plan for the development and colonization of the Zambezi 
valley", which includes the building of three smaller dams downstream 
which will make the Zambezi navigable from the Rhodesian frontier to the 
sea, and massive agricultural, mining and industrial projects . (56) 
But all these grandiose schemes are for an unfixed date in the future 
and have found no financial backing. What will concern us here is that 
part of the scheme which is in the course of realization: that is, the 
building of the Cabora-Bassa dam and the south bank power station, the 
construction of transmission lines to South Africa, and a few modest 
agricultural projects. 
The final capacity of the dam will be 4,000 MW, which would 
make it the fifth largest in the world for electric power production, 
but for the moment only the south bank power station is due for completion 
(in 1979), with a total capacity of 2,000 MW (57), some power being 
available from 1974. ESCOM has agreed to buy the vast majority of the 
power supplied, taking 1,700 MW minimum by 1980, and 1,400 kilometres of 
power lines are being built to connect the dam with the South African 
power station llApollon, near Pretoria. (58) In spite of the 
remarkable cheapness of the production of electricity at Cabora-Bassa, 
this long transmission line will make the electricity available in South 
Africa at a price the same or slightly higher than that supplied by her 
own thermal stations. (59) 
If South Africa will form the market for Cabora-Bassats power, 
South African private interests are also dominant in the ZAMCO consortium 
which is building the dam, although the Caetano government would have 
preferred an American or European consortium, and the issue was in doubt 
till the final signature of the convention in September 1969. Anglo- 
American dominates the consortium, although its exact financial 
participation is not known (60), and since 1969 various shifts in the 
composition of the consortium have strengthened the South African 
share (61), to the point that it is estimated that South African 
Companies account for about two-thirds of the sub-contracts. (62) 
The South African government is involved in the financing of 
the building of the dam to the tune of 20 million Rand (63), but the 
role of South African private banks is not known. (64) From every point 
of view, then, South Africa is heavily involved in the construction of 
Cabora-Bassa, which represents by far the largest single South African 
investment in Mozambique, coming at the end of a decade which has seen 
the progressive extension of South African influence in Mozambique's 
economy beyond the traditional labour-transport syndrome, and has made 
South Africa rather than the U.K. the principal foreign economic force 
in the territory. It is this very economic involvement which has led to 
a wider military co-operation with Portugal, symbolized again by the 
great dam at Cabora-Bassa which 3TELIMO has sworn to destroy. 
7. Military Co-operation 
This military co-operation, which includes Rhodesia, seems at 
the moment to be limited to co-ordination. Regular meetings are held 
by the chiefs of staff to discuss the evolution of guerilla warfare 
throughout southern Africa (65), and some limited logistic help - mainly 
helicopter transport - would seem to be given by South Africa to the 
Portuguese army (66). But the only instance of direct South African 
interference in Mozambique would seem to be the presence of some South 
, African troops in the Tete district, close to Cabora-Bassa. (67) And 
Mondlane himself, before his death, said that these had not actually 
been engaged against FRELIMO. (68) 
The reason for the presence of these troops is not entirely 
clear. From the military point of view, Portugal has the situation well 
in hand, and was never really seriously threatened by FRELIMO, even at 
the height of the latter's power. The protection of Cabora-Bassa would 
not seem to be the reason, as they are strung out along the south bank 
of the Zambezi (69) in such a way that they would find it very difficult 
to intercept a force coming from Zambia. One suggestion is that they 
are there for anti-guerilla "practice" (70), but if they have never 
engaged mRELIMO this would seem doubtful. Perhaps they are there rather 
to protect the right flank of the Rhodesian and South African forces 
operating in north-east Rhodesia; a small group of PAC guerillas with 
CORENO guides was intercepted while making its way through this area in 
1968. (71) Be this as it may, it is important to stress the very small- 
scale nature of actual South African military interference in Mozambique, 
which would seem to be largely the result of FREIIIMO~S incapacity to 
touch more than the relatively unimportant parts of northern Mozambique. 
What South Africa's reaction to a major guerilla advance into southern 
Mozambique would be can only be left to conjecture. 
8. Mozambique Settlers and South African Whites 
The increase in the white population of Mozambique can be 
seen in Table E. It is currently estimated at 150,000 (72) (although 
the presence of a large metropolitan army inflates the figures somewhat), 
concentrated very largely in the extreme south, in and around Lourengo 
Marques, and to a lesser extent in Beira and between Beira and the 
Rhodesian frontier. Unlike the Angolan whites, there are very few 
peasants among them, they are almost completely literate (73), and tend 
to come from a more aristocratic background with strong royalist 
elements. (74) This has facilitated the good relations with their white 
neighbours, which tourism, transport, communications and the practice of 
sending their children to English language universities in South Africa 
have all encouraged. English has long been almost as widely spokzn as 
Portuguese, particularly in Lourengo Marques and Beira. (75) 
Table E 
EVOLUTION OF MOZAMBIQUE POPULATION BY RACE 
Total White Asian African 
Sources: 1928 (estimate) - J. Duffey, Portugal in Africa, 1961, 
P* 145. 
1950 (census) - Hailey, An African Survey, 1956. 
1960 (official estimate) - Abshire & Samuels, Chap. 10. 
With this long and important tradition of contact and 
friendship with their white neighbours has come the natural adoption of 
the same racist attitudes, on which all visitors coment (76) and which 
even the Portuguese government tacitly admits by broadcasting anti-racist 
propaganda over the Loimengo Marques .radio. (77) 
With the war against FRELIMO in full swing, these white 
settlers are for the moment loyal to Lisbon, but they are vigilant 
against any concessions which the new Caetano regime might be tempted to 
make. The leader of the autonomist movement, Jorge Jardim, is a 
contradictory figure. Fervent monarchist and great admirer of the late 
Antonio Salazar, he is at the same time a personal friend of Ian Smith 
and a proponent of a Southern African Federation which would include 
South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique. (78) 
The strength of autonomist feeling is difficult to judge, but 
it is important to note that, should Portugual~s will to remain in Africa 
weaken, the Mozambique settlers would be prepared to declare U.D.I. and 
turn to their white neighbours for help, which in the last analysis means 
South Africa. 
9. Conclusion 
From this brief sketch of South African involvement in 
Mozambique over the last ten years, two aspects ought perhaps to emerge 
as particularly worthy of note. South Africa still relies to a very 
large extent on Mozambique labour for its mines, although this situation 
is slowly changing, and it is this labour recruiting which, by the quota 
system on the Lourengo Marques railway, provides Mozambique with one of 
its most important sources of income. Secondly, the capacity of the 
Portuguese to maintain themselves in Mozambique is increasingly becoming 
the key to the whole evolution of the situation in southern Africa, and 
this is increasingly drawing Soutn Africa into Mozambique, economically 
for the moment but with the possibility of important military commitments 
in the future. For if l?EE%3T"IO controlled fizanbique, then Y~lawi, Rhodesia 
and even Swaziland could probably slip out of South Africa's sphere of 
influence and South Africa would have a military threat on its frontiers, 
a mere 350 miles away from Pretoria. 
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